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Abstract: The article critically examines the EU’s conceptualisation of 
the rule of law in its enlargement practice. Two main arguments will 
be advanced. First, it will be argued that legality is a core element of 
the rule of law, and adherence to it is a fundamental characteristic of 
any institutional order governed by the rule of law, as evidenced in 
the Treaty (Article 2 TEU) and as acknowledged in the jurisprudence 
of the Court of Justice. Secondly, it will be shown that the EU’s pre-ac-
cession process does not suffi ciently address this rule of law element, 
to the extent that a) its main focus is alignment with the acquis, and 
b) changes made to domestic legislation are measured in terms of 
quantity and not quality. It will be demonstrated that this generates 
problems of legality in the candidate states, including legal infl ation, 
instability, lack of generality of law and coherence, as well as prob-
lems of enforcement. It will be asserted that even though this is rec-
ognised by the Commission, over the years the EU has not amended 
its methodology, thereby failing to recognise that ensuring respect for 
the rule of law is not merely a process of adoption of a corpus of rules, 
but rather a complex process of adaptation to a particular value sys-
tem. The article continues by arguing that the quality and complexity 
of the acquis leave considerable room for improvement, while at the 
same time raising questions as to its suitability as an instrument for 
development in the (potential) candidate countries. As a conclusion, 
some policy refl ections will be offered on how these issues could be 
better addressed. 
Keywords: EU rule of law, legality, EU enlargement, EU acquis, quan-
titative approach, benchmarking
1 Introduction
The founding Treaties attest to the fact that from its inception the 
European integration project has been geared towards deeper political 
cooperation, predicated on a set of core values with a principal emphasis 
on the rule of law. The current rule of law crisis in newer Member States, 
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such as Poland, Hungary and Romania, has called into question the in-
tegration project by casting doubt on the extent to which foundational EU 
values are truly embedded in the legal orders of new Member States. While 
there is a signifi cant body of literature analysing the concrete legal bases 
and instruments the EU may avail itself of in enforcing the rule of law, 
the role of the Union’s pre-accession process in the emerging threat to the 
rule of law has largely remained unexplored. In this sense, the current de-
bate is limited to the pitfalls of internal rule of law oversight mechanisms, 
whereas in reality the consolidation of the rule of law in new Member 
States is supposed to occur at a much earlier stage, ie during the pre-ac-
cession process. This raises the question as to whether the pre-accession 
process suffi ciently robustly addresses rule of law reform. 
In this light, this contribution critically examines the EU’s concep-
tualisation of the rule of law in its enlargement policy with a view to 
ascertaining whether the current value crisis can be traced back to the 
interpretation of the rule of law and external mechanisms for ensuring 
respect for this value in the accession process. It will do so by focusing 
on one of the widely accepted core elements of the concept of the rule of 
law, namely legality. It will be shown that legality operates in two ways: 
it sets requirements for government in its relation to its laws, and it 
provides criteria for the validity of law itself. In this way, it underpins 
the rule of law ideal in that it helps guide the behaviour of individuals 
and sets requirements that curb the power of the governing. It will be 
demonstrated that adherence to legality is a fundamental characteristic 
of any institutional order governed by the rule of law, as evidenced in the 
Treaty (Article 2 TEU) and as acknowledged in the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice.
Against this background, the article turns next to the EU’s enlarge-
ment practice in order to ascertain whether, and if so to what extent, 
legality forms a core principle of the Union’s rule of law reform efforts in 
the acceding states. Two main problems are identifi ed in this respect. 
First, despite the central role of legality internally, it will be shown that 
the element is virtually absent from the EU’s external conceptualisation 
of the rule of law. In the Copenhagen documentation, containing the 
Commission’s yearly monitoring reports, enlargement strategies as well 
as the Council conclusions on enlargement, little to no room has been 
dedicated to a progress analysis of this element. Secondly, it is asserted 
that the very methodology used in the pre-accession process undermines 
legality in the acceding states. More particularly, it will be argued that 
the EU’s pre-accession methodology is problematic to the extent that its 
main focus is alignment with the acquis, and changes made to domes-
tic legislation are measured in terms of quantity (ie the number of laws 
adopting EU legislation), and not quality. It is shown that this generates 
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problems of legality in the candidate states, including legal infl ation, in-
stability, lack of generality of law and coherence, as well as problems of 
enforcement. It will be asserted that even though this is recognised by 
the Commission, over the years the EU has not amended its method-
ology, thereby failing to recognise that ensuring respect for the rule of 
law is not merely a process of adoption of a corpus of rules, but rather a 
complex process of adaptation to a particular value system. The article 
concludes by arguing that the value narrative of European integration 
is undermined by the EU’s own pre-accession practice, thereby being a 
contributing factor to the rule of law related concerns of today. 
Before moving on to the main body of the text, a caveat should be 
added. The article does not claim that the EU’s conceptualisation of the 
rule of law in the pre-accession process, and, more particularly, the lack 
of legality therein, is the sole contributing factor to the current value crisis 
in the aforementioned Member States.1 Such a direct causal connection 
would be diffi cult to establish and goes beyond the ambit of this article. 
Rather, it suggests that the overlooked aspect of the lack of legality in the 
enlargement process really deserves focused attention as it suggests cer-
tain linkages between the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law, the 
strategy it relies on for the value’s implementation during the accession 
process, and the questions this raises as to the extent to which the val-
ue is ‘truly and clearly embedded’2 in the future Member States. Lack of 
embeddedness is likely to lead to issues further down the road and after 
accession. Accordingly, the article merely suggests that the rule of law re-
lated problems in some of the current Member States may arguably, even 
to a small extent, be traced back to the enlargement process.
2 Legality as a core element of the rule of law 
In this section, it will fi rst be shown that legality is a core element of 
the rule of law, containing various sub-elements necessary for law’s over-
all quality, such as stability, coherence, and enforcement. Following this, 
it will be asserted that the rule of law, including legality, is of vital im-
portance for the functioning of the EU legal order and should, thus, also 
form part of the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement.
There is widely held agreement amongst legal scholars that, at its 
core, the rule of law requires that both governments and citizens are 
1  For some broader literature on the current crisis, see, for example, Heather Grabbe and 
Stefan Lehne, ‘Defending EU Values in Poland and Hungary’ (Carnegie Europe, 4 September 
2017) <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/09/04/defending-eu-values-in-poland-and-hun-
gary-pub-72988> accessed 20 October 2019. 
2  Commission, ‘2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (Communication) COM 
(2019) 260 fi nal 3. 
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bound by and act consistently with the law.3 Finnis,4 MacCormick,5 and 
Waldron6 all share the view that there are certain features the law must 
possess in order to successfully fulfi l its function as law and for the 
rule of law to effectively protect citizens and guide individual behaviour. 
From this, a number of common characteristics have been deduced, in 
line with a list of formal principles articulated by, most notably, Fuller7 
and Finnis:8 laws must be prospective, be made public, be general, be 
clear, be stable, certain, coherent, and be applied to everyone according 
to their terms.9 Consequently, formal legality provides requirements for 
the validity of law itself, which, in turn, can aid citizens in taking con-
trol over their own lives and curb the power of the governing. Similar 
key aspects of the rule of law are also refl ected in many of the constitu-
tions of the Member States. For instance, provisions on the hierarchy of 
norms by which administrative acts are subordinated to parliamentary 
statutes can be found, amongst other systems, in the Estonian, French, 
German, Italian, and Swedish legal systems.10 Further examples of rule 
of law facets include the requirement of a parliamentary statute for the 
imposition of obligations, administrative charges or penalties, and crim-
inal punishment;11 legal certainty and the foreseeability of law;12 rules on 
parliamentary reservations and the conditions and grounds for limiting 
fundamental rights.13
For the EU, legality is one of the rule of law’s central elements, men-
tioned fi rst in the enumeration of rule of law elements in the Commis-
sion’s initial attempt at formulating the core components of the notion 
3  See, for example, Brian Z Tamanaha, ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’ in Gianluigi 
Palombella and Neil Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 4.
4  John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980) 270-276.
5  Neil MacCormick, ‘Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals’ in Robert P George 
(ed), Natural Law Theory (OUP 1992) 121-125.
6  Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 GL Rev 1.
7  Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised edition, Yale University Press 1969).
8  Finnis (n 4).
9  Fuller (n 7) 39; Finnis (n 4) 170-171.
10  See, for an overview, Anneli Albi and Samo Bardutzky (eds), National Constitutions in 
European and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law (Springer 2019). 
11  See, for example, Joakim Nergelius, ‘The Constitution of Sweden and European Infl u-
ences: The Changing Balance between Democratic and Judicial Power’ in Albi and Bardutz-
ky (n 10) 334.
12   See, for example, Peter G Xuereb, ‘The Constitution of Malta: Refl ections on New Mech-
anisms for Synchrony of Values in Different Levels of Governance’ in Albi and Bardutzky 
(n 10) 157; Joan Solanes Mullor and Aida Torres Pérez, ‘The Constitution of Spain: The 
Challenges for the Constitutional Order Under European and Global Governance’ in Albi 
and Bardutzky (n 10) 553. 
13  See, for example, Leonard Besselink and Monica Claes, ‘The Netherlands: The Pragmat-
ics of a Flexible, Europeanised Constitution’ in Albi and Bardutzky (n 10) 206-207.
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in the context of the ‘EU Framework to strengthen the rule of law inter-
nally’.14 Indeed, legality, which is described as ‘a transparent account-
able, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws’,15 has been 
confi rmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) as 
a fundamental principle of the Union, by stating that ‘… in a commu-
nity governed by the rule of law, adherence to legality must be proper-
ly ensured’.16 Similarly, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission − a 
body that works on interpreting and articulating the common European 
constitutional heritage and has been particularly active in assisting the 
new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe from the beginning of 
the 1990s on their paths to EU accession17 − identifi es legality as one of 
fi ve main rule of law elements.18 According to its ‘Rule of Law Checklist’, 
legality implies, inter alia, that state action must be in accordance with 
and authorised by the law, that public offi cials respect both procedural 
and substantive law, that law-making procedures are clear, and that the 
law is effectively implemented and enforced.19 Accordingly, legality cre-
ates a benchmark for the quality of laws and serves as a protective value 
against governments overstepping their power.
As a founding value of the European project,20 the rule of law not 
only guides the EU’s conduct,21 it also underpins the governing orders 
14  Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Communication) 
COM(2014) 158 fi nal 4. The other rule of law elements in the Commission’s non-exhaustive 
list are: legal certainty; the prohibition of arbitrariness of executive powers; independent 
and impartial courts; effective judicial review, including respect for fundamental rights; and 
equality before the law.
15  COM(2014) 158 fi nal Annex 1. 
16  Case C-496/99 P Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta [2004] ECR I-03891, para 63. 
17  On the relation between the EU and the Venice Commission, see, for example, Wolfgang 
Hoffmann-Riem, ‘The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe − Standards and Impact’ 
(2014) 25 EJIL 579.
18  Next to legality, the checklist also mentions legal certainty, prevention of abuse of pow-
ers, equality before the law and non-discrimination, access to justice, including an inde-
pendent and impartial judiciary and the right to a fair trial. 
19  Venice Commission, ‘Rule of Law Checklist’ (CDL-AD(2016)007) <www.venice.coe.int/
webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffi le=CDL-AD(2016)007-e> accessed 20 October 2019.
20  In the context of the high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on the 
rule of law at national and international level on 24 September 2012, the European Union 
issued a statement on its relation to the rule of law in which it called the latter one of the 
‘pillars on which our European Union is built’. José Manuel Durão Barroso 24 Septem-
ber 2012, Statement by Commission President Barroso at the High-level Meeting on the 
Rule of Law <www.avrupa.info.tr/en/news/statement-president-barroso-high-level-meet-
ing-rule-law-2184> accessed 20 October 2019. On the acknowledged constitutive dimen-
sion for the Union’s own identity, see Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C 415/05 P Kadi v 
Council [2008] ECR I-6351, para 285. See also Annex I to COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2 in which 
the Commission refers to the rule of law as ‘a legally binding constitutional principle’.
21  See Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Communication) 
COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2.
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of all individual Member States (Article 2 TEU). Moreover, it has both 
an internal and an external dimension. Internally, the ‘mutually inter-
dependent legal relations’22 linking the EU and its Member States, and 
its Member States with each other, are premised on the existence of mu-
tual trust between Member States in recognition of the rule of law as a 
shared values and respect for EU law.23 As emphasised by Commissioner 
Reding, ‘[r]espect for the rule of law is in many ways a prerequisite for 
the protection of all other fundamental rights listed in Article 2 TEU and 
for upholding all rights and obligations deriving from the Treaties’.24 In 
addition to it being a vital precondition for the functioning of the EU legal 
order itself, the rule of law is also a source of legitimacy for the EU’s ex-
ternal conduct as a value-driven international actor,25 giving weight to its 
ambitions of value-based relations and interactions with third countries 
(Article 3(5) and 21(1) and (2)(b) TEU). 
Enlargement, as the Union’s Member State building-policy, lies at 
the intersection of both these dimensions, functioning as a showcase 
for the EU’s external efforts regarding rule of law promotion, and, at the 
same time, as a testing ground for the Union’s forays into elucidating the 
notion’s component elements at the domestic level of the future Member 
States.26 It would go beyond the ambit of this article to analyse all the 
elements of the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement, 
which include an accessible judiciary27 that functions effectively,28 ex-
ercises judicial review,29 and can be held accountable.30 It also includes 
22  Opinion 2/13 pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (ECHR II) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para 
167. 
23  Ibid, para 168.
24  Viviane Reding, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law − What Next?’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_SPEECH-13-677_en.htm> accessed 20 October 2019.
25  Recently, see Commission, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ (Report) June 2016, para 
3.5.
26  See, for instance, the pre-accession process which links progression towards accession, 
and thus to the status of Member State, to the applicant’s respect for the Union’s values. 
See, for example, para 4 of the Preamble of Council Regulation (EC) 231/2014 establishing 
an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) [2014] OJ L77/11.
27  See, for example, Regular Report Poland (1999) 14; Regular Report Romania SEC(2002) 
1409, 28; Progress Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia SEC(2007) 1432, 12.
28  See, for example, Regular Report Poland (1999) 15; Regular Report Slovenia (1999) 59; 
Regular Report Romania (2000) 92; Regular Report Latvia SEC(2001) 1749, 17; Progress 
Report Croatia, SEC(2005) 1424, 15; Progress Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia SEC(2010) 1332, 57; Progress Report Serbia, SWD(2013) 412 fi nal, 40; Report Albania 
SWD(2016) 364 fi nal, 40.
29  See, for example, Regular Report Poland (2000) 19; Regular Report Bulgaria (2001); Pro-
gress Report Montenegro (2008) 13.
30  See, for example, Progress Report Croatia (2005) 84; Progress Report Serbia (2012) 10; 
Progress Report Kosovo SWD(2014) 306 fi nal 13. 
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checks on police and security forces,31 as well as appropriate prison con-
ditions, and the proper treatment of suspects.32 Instead, the main fo-
cus of this article will be on formal legality, and, more particularly, on 
the sub-elements of stability and coherence (non-contradiction) of legal 
rules, as well as their enforcement. Stability of laws implies that laws 
remain stable or unchanged over a period of time to provide the neces-
sary constraints and predictability for decision-making.33 Coherence of 
laws refl ects clear and non-contradictory laws that enable citizens to 
follow them and for the judiciary to apply them consistently. This entails 
that the legislature has an obligation to endeavour not to include con-
fl icting provisions within a single law, nor to enact a law that negates a 
provision, or even objective, of another law. Moreover, the requirement of 
non-contradiction also acts on a more abstract level of coherence, that 
of the legal system with its moral-political underpinnings.34 Accordingly, 
Dworkin has argued that law is morally incoherent if its underlying jus-
tifi cations and the various prescriptions cannot be subsumed under one 
coherent moral theory.35 However, he was well aware of the fact that the 
laws’ moral soundness had to be balanced against the legal system’s in-
tegrity, thereby allowing for the rectifi cation of possible past mistakes.36 
Finally, for law to function properly, various law enforcement agencies 
and the judiciary must apply it, while simultaneously preventing a dis-
crepancy between the rules as declared and as they are actually admin-
istered.37 Only if deviations from the rules are treated as such can rules 
guide human conduct and will individuals stick to the rules. 
31  See, for example, Regular Report Turkey (2002) 22; Progress Report Serbia (2012) 11.
32  See, for example, Regular Report Romania, SEC(2002) 1409, 28.
33  Fuller (n 7) 70-79. Stability of the (national) legal framework features prominently as one 
of legality’s main aspects put forward by most legal philosophers. For example, Joseph Raz, 
The Authority of Law (Clarendon Press 1979) ch 11; Finnis (n 4) 270-276; Neil MacCormick, 
‘Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals’ in Robert P George (ed), Natural Law 
Theory (OUP 1992) 121-125; Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 
GL Rev 1; Robert S Summers, ‘The Principles of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 74 NDL Rev 1691.
34  Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 176-224.
35  Andrew Marmor, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Limits’ USC Public Policy Research Paper 
16/2003, 36 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=424613> accessed 
20 October 2019.
36  Dworkin (n 34) 65-72. For Raz’s opinion on this particular point, see Joseph Raz, ‘The 
Relevance of Coherence’ (1992) 72 BUL Rev 273. For the questionability of the argument on 
moral coherence in light of current pluralist societies, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism 
(Columbia University Press 2005) 11-14. 
37  Fuller (n 7) 81. 
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3 The EU’s pre-accession process and the missing element of 
legality 
Having highlighted the rule of law’s core element of legality and 
placed it within the context of the Union’s enlargement policy, the ar-
ticle will next turn to this external policy area in order to provide the 
background for the rest of the article. It will be shown that in spite of 
the increasing focus put on the rule of law in the pre-accession process, 
legality, in terms of legal stability, coherence, and enforcement, seems to 
be omitted from the Commission’s understanding of the rule of law. More 
particularly, it will be argued that even though some attention is paid to 
administrative reforms in the context of the transposition of the acquis, 
the Commission has not put forward standards in relation to the quality 
of domestic legislation.
On 1 May 2004, ten new Member States acceded to the EU (the 
Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), followed on 1 
January 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania, and on 1 July 2013 by Croatia. 
Currently the EU is negotiating with the candidate countries Montene-
gro, Serbia, and Turkey. At the moment of writing, the decision to start 
accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania has just been 
reverted to the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb in May 2020.38 
Lastly, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have been recognised as 
potential candidate countries. Based on Article 49 TEU, EU enlargement 
has developed into an elaborate process including negotiations, Commis-
sion monitoring, and far-reaching domestic reforms. 
In previous enlargement rounds, both democratic (Spain, Portugal, 
and Greece39) and economic (United Kingdom40) considerations played 
a role. However, it was with the pre-accession strategy in the context of 
the accession of the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) 
that more details were fl eshed out regarding the accession conditions. 
According to the well-known Copenhagen criteria of 1993, membership 
requires stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
38  Council, ‘Conclusions’, Council Doc. EUCO 23/19 point 5.
39  See Commission, ‘Spain’s Application for Membership’ (Opinion) COM(78) 630, 9;  Com-
mission, ‘Portuguese Application for Membership’(Opinion) COM(78) 220, 7; Commission, 
‘Greek Application for Membership’ (Opinion) COM(76) 30 fi nal.
40  De Gaulle vetoed the fi rst request on grounds of economic suitability. He then expressed 
a second veto during a press conference on 27 November 1967. Notwithstanding offi cial 
support from the other EEC Member States, the Council of Ministers decided in December 
of the same year to shelve all four applications: ‘One Member State considered that the 
re-establishment of the British economy must be completed before Great Britain’s request 
can be considered’. See Christopher Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European 
Union (Routledge 1997).
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human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning 
market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market 
forces; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership, includ-
ing adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.41 
Under the fi rst Copenhagen condition in relation to the rule of law, 
the Commission’s strategy papers42 and monitoring reports,43 as well as 
the Council’s conclusions on enlargement,44 indicate a clear emphasis 
in relation to the reform efforts in the candidate state on the traditional 
state-run institutions of justice and capacity building − the courts, police, 
prisons, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, as well as the regulations and pro-
cedures covering their actions and behaviour.45 This includes, inter alia, 
the procedures regulating the careers of judges such as their remuner-
ation46 and dismissal,47 legal aid provisions,48 and anti-corruption mea-
sures.49 However, in the EU institutions’ analyses, legality is noticeably 
absent. To some extent this is not surprising, considering that the agree-
ments underlying the EU’s cooperation with the candidate countries − 
the Europe Agreements with the CEECs,50 the Association Agreement 
41  Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993. 
42  The current Commission set out its thoughts on the rule of law most clearly in its 2012 
strategy. Commission, ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013’ (Communi-
cation) COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 4-6. 
43  See, for example, Montenegro Report, SWD(2016) 360 fi nal 12-18. 
44  See, for example, Council Conclusions ‘The Application of Conditionality with a View 
to Developing a Coherent EU-Strategy for the Relations with the Countries in the Region’, 
Annex to Annex III, 2203rd General Affairs Council, 29-30 April 1997.
45  On the institutional focus of the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in enlargement 
generally, see Marko KmeziÊ, EU Rule of Law Promotion. Judiciary Reform in the Western 
Balkans (Routledge 2017); Kalypso Nicolaides and Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Rethinking Europe’s 
“Rule of Law” and Enlargement Agenda: The Fundamental Dilemma’ (2012) Jean Mon-
net Working Paper 12/2012 <https://jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/rethinking-eu-
ropes-rule-of-law-and-enlargement-agenda-the-fundamental-dilemma/> accessed 20 October 
2019; Dimitry Kochenov,  EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession 
Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Kluwer Law International 
2008). 
46  See, for example, Regular Report Lithuania (2001) 18.
47  See, for example, Progress Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, SEC(2011) 
1203 fi nal 58; Progress Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, SWD(2013) 413 
fi nal 39.
48  See, for example, Monitoring Report Romania, SEC(2006) 596 7; Comprehensive Moni-
toring Report Lithuania, SEC(2003) 1204 fi nal 13; Comprehensive Monitoring Report Cro-
atia, SWD(2012) 338 fi nal 37.
49  See, for example, Progress Report Estonia (2000) 17; Comprehensive Monitoring Report 
Latvia (2003) 14-15; Progress Report Turkey (2008) 10-11; Progress Report Albania (2012) 
14-16.  
50  Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of 
Hungary [1993] OJ L347/2; Europe Agreement establishing an association between the 
EC and the Republic of Poland [1993] OJ L348/2; Europe Agreement establishing an as-
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with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey,51 and the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements (SAAs) with the Western Balkan countries52 − do not provide 
much clarity on the notion. The Europe Agreements merely mention the 
signifi cance of the rule of law for the political system of the candidate 
countries in the Preamble, and, in the case of the SAAs, list a number of 
judicial institution related rule of law elements, such as the judiciary, the 
police and other enforcement bodies.53 
In turn, the fi nancial instruments underpinning the enlargement 
policy tend also to either stay silent on the topic, or emphasise the rule 
of law in this institutional understanding. Thus, the original PHARE 
Regulation and the Regulations relating to the accession partnerships of 
the CEECs do not add insight in terms of the EU’s understanding of the 
rule of law in this context,54 and the CARDS Regulation55 as well as the 
sociation between the EC and Romania [1994] OJ L357/2; Europe Agreement establishing 
an association between the EC and the Republic of Bulgaria [1994] OJ L358/3; Europe 
Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Slovakia [1994] 
OJ L359/2; Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Czech 
Republic [1994] OJ L360/2; Europe Agreement establishing an association between the 
EC and the Republic of Latvia [1998] OJ L26/3; Europe Agreement establishing an associ-
ation between the EC and the Republic of Lithuania [1998] OJ L51/3; Europe Agreement 
establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Estonia [1998] OJ L68/3; 
Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Slovenia 
[1999] OJ L51/3.
51  Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey [1964] OJ 
P217/3687; Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Malta [1971] OJ 
L61/2; Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and the Republic of Cyprus 
[1973] OJ L133/2.
52  Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the former Yugoslav Republic of Mac-
edonia [2004] OJ L84/13; Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of 
Croatia [2005] OJ L26/3; Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of 
Albania [2009] OJ L107/166; Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of 
Montenegro [2010] OJ L108/3; Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic 
of Serbia [2013] OJ L278/16; Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, of the other part [2015] OJ L164/2; Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
with Kosovo,* [2016] OJ L 71/3.
53  See, for example Article 80 entitled ‘Reinforcement of institutions and the rule of law’ of 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia (n 52). 
54  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to the Re-
public of Hungary and the Polish People’s Republic (Phare Regulation) [1989] OJ L375/11; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 of 21 June 1999 on coordinating aid to the appli-
cant countries in the framework of the pre-accession strategy and amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 3906/89 [1999] OJ L161/68; Council Regulation (EC) No 555/2000 13 March 
2000 on the implementation of operations in the framework of the pre-accession strategy 
for the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Malta [2000] OJ L68/3.
55  Article 2(3) Council Regulation (EC) 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000 on assistance for 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the For-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 and amend-
ing Regulation (EEC) No 2906/89 and (EEC) No 1360/90 and Decisions 97/256/EC and 
1999/311/EC [2000] OJ L306/1.
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Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA I56 and II57) stipulate that 
assistance should be programmed and implemented, inter alia, in rela-
tion to institution and capacity building.58 Furthermore, the 2005 nego-
tiating frameworks for Croatia59 and Turkey60 introduced a specifi c nego-
tiating chapter meant to assist enlargement countries in establishing a 
society based on the rule of law. However, in a similar fashion to the EU’s 
rule of law understanding mentioned above, this Chapter 23, focused on 
judiciary functioning and capacity, has, from the moment of its inclu-
sion, demonstrated a mostly institutional/procedural understanding of 
the notion.61 Any reference to legality’s sub-elements of the quality of the 
legislative framework, stability and/or coherence of legislation is absent. 
However, considering that the EU, under the third Copenhagen con-
dition, is obligated to implement the entire EU acquis,62 which now con-
sists of 35 chapters, the issue of stability and coherence of the domestic 
legal framework would be expected to be especially pertinent. This par-
ticularly so, considering that the Union is not just a free-trade zone that 
requires its members to tear down barriers, but a community of law and 
56  Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an instrument for 
pre-accession assistance (IPA) [2006] OJ L210/82.
57  Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing an instrument for pre-accession assistance for the period 2014-2020 (IPA 
II) [2014] OJ L77/11.
58  Article 3(1)(a) Regulation (EU) No 231/2014. According to the overall institutional ap-
proach, the specifi c objectives pursued under the Regulation framed the rule of law in 
terms of an independent and effi cient judiciary as well as capacity-building measures for 
improving law enforcement. See Article 2. For the previous IPA Regulation, see Article 3(1)
(a) Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006. Also see paragraph 13 of its Preamble, which states 
that: ‘Assistance for candidate countries as well as for potential candidate countries should 
continue to support them in their efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule 
of law… and it should therefore be targeted at supporting a wide range of institution-building 
measures’ (emphasis added). 
59  Negotiating Framework for Croatia, 3 October 2005.
60  Negotiating Framework for Turkey, 3 October 2005.
61  The set-up of Chapter 23 has not changed much since its inclusion and, regarding the 
rule of law, it is comprised of the following elements: the functioning and capacity of judicial 
bodies, such as Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils; judicial independence and impar-
tiality; judicial accountability; judicial professionalism and competence; quality of justice, 
measured in terms of the training of judicial personnel and IT strategies; judicial effi ciency 
(case backlog); and anti-corruption measures.
62  In 1992, the Commission defi ned the acquis in the context of accession as ‘the rights and 
obligations actual and potential, of the community system and its institutional framework’, 
which encompass ‘the contents, principles and political objectives of the Treaties …, the 
legislation adopted in implementation of the Treaties, and the jurisprudence of the Court; 
the declarations and resolutions adopted in the Community framework; the international 
agreements, and the agreements between Member States connected with the Community’s 
activities’. Commission, ‘Report on Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement’ prepared for 
the European Council, Lisbon 26-27 June 1992, 12. 
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a market-regulating organisation,63 with a rather large body of rules that 
must be transposed into domestic law. Interestingly, already in 1995 in 
its White Paper on the preparation of the CEECs in their preparation for 
the implementation of, specifi cally, the internal market acquis, the Com-
mission pointed to the diffi culty of this endeavour in terms of legislative 
coherence: 
The general picture is one in which old legislation, sometimes dating 
back many years, exists alongside new. In a limited number of sec-
tors, the new law is almost complete, while in others legislation may be 
scheduled but not yet drafted. A very large amount of new law is be-
ing drafted, or is awaiting adoption by national parliaments… In some 
areas, the CEECs themselves recognise that enacted or prepared leg-
islation does not conform fully with the relevant EU texts, either as a 
deliberate choice … or as a result of amendments introduced during the 
passage of the legislation through Parliament.64
The realisation came that the necessary administrative structures 
were lagging behind the legislative process itself; implementation is a 
complex process that requires ‘the creation or adaptation of the neces-
sary institutions and structures, involving fundamental changes in the 
responsibilities of both the national administrative and judicial systems 
and the emerging private sector’.65 As a reaction, the European Council 
acknowledged that the third Copenhagen criterion, the ability to assume 
the obligations of membership, also presupposes adequate administra-
tive capacity for effective transposition, implementation, and enforce-
ment of EU rules.66 
It is interesting to note, though, that an incremental focus on public 
administration reform, although vital for the effective implementation of 
the acquis, seems to not necessarily have led to a better quality of legis-
lation. This much is visible from the fact that despite the fi nding that the 
63  Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Process of Enlargement: Problems, Interests, Norms’ in Jer-
emy Richardson (ed), European Union: Power and Policy-making (Routledge 2006) 207, 209.
64  Commission, ‘Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for 
Integration into the Internal Market of the Union’ (White Paper) COM(95) 163 fi nal points 
4.7-4.8. 
65  ibid, point 3.25. 
66  Presidency Conclusions, Madrid European Council, 15-16 December 1995. See also 
Commission, ‘Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union’ (Communication) COM(97) 
2000 fi nal. The emphasis on enforcement is also visible in the text of the SAAs. While the 
Europe Agreements recognised ‘the approximation of that country’s existing and future leg-
islation to that of the Community’ as the major precondition for the economic integration of 
the applicant state, the SAAs stipulate the ‘importance of the approximation of the existing 
legislation in Montenegro to that of the Community and of its effective implementation’. See 
Article 68 of the Europe Agreement with Poland (n 50). For the SAAs, see, for example, 72(1) 
of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Montenegro (emphasis added) (n 52).
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current Commission has made public administration reform an enlarge-
ment priority under its ‘fundamentals fi rst’ approach in relation to the 
Western Balkans,67 the Commission’s own analysis in its enlargement 
strategies, as well as SIGMA68 assessments of the progress made by the 
candidate countries and potential candidates, frequently demonstrates 
that the poor quality of domestic legislation,69 the lack of further signifi -
cant progress in legislative alignment with the acquis,70 as well as issues 
of application and enforcement,71 remain recurring problems throughout 
the years and across all Western Balkan countries. Considering this 
assessment, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Commission pri-
marily conceives of the rule of law in institutional/procedural terms and 
pays little attention to the elements of legal quality, stability, coherence, 
and enforcement of rules. After all, even in the context of legal approxi-
mation, its focus is on institutional public administration reform, rather 
than on legality itself. Against this background, the next section will 
focus on the pre-accession process and how the Commission’s methodol-
ogy actually further undermines legality’s sub-elements outlined above. 
67  Next to the emphasis on the importance of the rule of law for the transformation the 
applicant countries are undertaking, administrative reforms and economic governance and 
competitiveness are the three strategic ingredients necessary for the consolidation of reform 
efforts and the implementation of the acquis put forward by the Commission in its 2014 
Strategy: ‘All three “pillars” are closely linked, cross-cutting issues of fundamental impor-
tance for success in political and economic reforms and building a basis for implementing 
EU rules and standards’. Commission, ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-
2015’ (Communication) COM(2014) 700 fi nal 4.
68  SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) is a joint initiative 
of the OECD and the EU with the objective of strengthening the foundations for improved 
public governance <www.sigmaweb.org/> accessed 20 October 2019.
69  See, for example, SIGMA Assessment Report Albania (2014) 36 <www.oecd-ilibrary.
org/governance/albania-assessment-report-2014_5jm0xw5rq4f3-en> accessed 20 October 
2019; SIGMA Assessment Report Serbia (2012) 3 < www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/ser-
bia-assessment-report-2012_5jz2rqnf9p6g-en> accessed 20 October 2019; SIGMA Assess-
ment Report Albania (2012) 3 <www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/albania-assessment-re-
port-2012_5jz2rql8z4mr-en> accessed 20 October  2019; SIGMA Assessment Report Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (2012) 3 <www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/bosnia-and-herzegovina-as-
sessment-report-2012_5jz2rqlcrnkd-en> accessed 20 October 2019; SIGMA Assessment 
Report Montenegro (2012) 3 <www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/montenegro-assess-
ment-report-2012_5jz2rqn827d2-en> accessed 20 October 2019.
70  See, for example, SIGMA Assessment Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(2012) 3 <www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedo-
nia-assessment-report-2012_5jz2rqlfx68q-en> accessed 20 October 2019; SIGMA Assess-
ment Report Kosovo (2012) 4 <www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/kosovo-assessment-re-
port-2012_5jz2rqljfmxw-en> accessed 20 October 2019. 
71  See, for example, Commission, ‘2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (Com-
munication) COM(2016) 715 fi nal 18-20. 
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4 The pre-accession process and the problems with legality
The argument which will be advanced here is that the EU, in the 
pre-accession process, has put its main focus on the alignment of legis-
lation with the acquis whereby the changes made to domestic legislation 
are measured in terms of quantity, not of quality. It will be asserted that 
the demands of legal approximation in combination with the quantitative 
approach underlying the enlargement policy actually undermine legality, by 
creating problems such as legal infl ation, instability of laws, and lack of co-
herence of rules (section 4.1). The article demonstrates that although these 
shortcomings are acknowledged by the Commission, it has not adapted the 
pre-accession process in relation to these legality concerns throughout the 
years, thereby failing to recognise the pitfalls of its own accession meth-
odology for the implementation of the rule of law in future Member States 
(section 4.2). Moreover, it will be shown that there is a substantial and 
growing body of literature that questions the top-down and infl exible ap-
proach by the Commission towards the candidate countries. More particu-
larly, it will be asserted that even though there is growing evidence that for 
law to be effective local ‘adaptation’ is preferred over ‘adoption’, the nature 
of the acquis is such that it precludes alterations by the applicant states, 
thereby leaving little to no room for considerations of the quality of the 
transposed laws within the overall domestic legal framework (section 4.3). 
4.1 Benchmarking: the quantitative approach in relation to the 
transposition of the acquis
Exploring the relevant enlargement related documents, it appears 
that the Commission has attempted to create the impression of having 
constructed a pre-accession procedure that examines not just law in the 
books, but, rather, rule of law in action. For example, in the very fi rst 
composite paper, the Commission stressed that concerning democracy 
and the rule of law, it has looked at ‘the way democracy functions in 
practice instead of relying on formal descriptions of the political insti-
tutions’.72 In 2010, the then EU enlargement Commissioner Füle, during 
his presentation of the yearly Enlargement Strategy, underscored that: 
The EU expects a convincing track record in the fulfi lment of these 
benchmarks, in particular regarding judiciary and fundamental rights. 
Accession negotiations do not simply involve ticking boxes about legis-
lative approximation. Countries must build a credible track record of 
reform and implementation, in particular in the area of rule of law.73 
72  Commission, ‘Composite Paper - Reports on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the 
Candidate Countries’ (Communication) COM(1998) 712 fi nal 3. 
73  Stefan Füle, ‘Speech on Enlargement Package’ (2010) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_SPEECH-10-639_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 20 October 2019. Similar terminology 
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This suggests that the Commission in the enlargement policy has 
not merely adopted an approach towards its rule of law reform that would 
focus on creating functioning institutions, the adoption of EU legislation 
and a quantitative progress analysis thereof during the pre-accession 
process, but a process that examines the quality of laws, of how law 
is applied in practice and of how law both guides people’s behaviour 
and sets the boundaries for institutions. However, it will be demonstrat-
ed that in contrast to the Commission’s claims, progress in the area 
of alignment of domestic legislation with the acquis is assessed not in 
terms of whether the adopted legislation works effectively in practice or 
whether it has improved domestic legislation in certain areas, but rather, 
in terms of quantity, ie the amount of adopted laws and regulations. 
Legal approximation of the EU acquis, as seen in the previous sec-
tion, is a critical component of the pre-accession process; alignment leads 
to credibility of reforms, and thus to progress in the arduous and lengthy 
transition process in candidate countries to make them fi t for accession. 
The logic behind this process assumes that the EU model brings with it 
a comprehensive quality and density of regulation that is superior to the 
existing legislation in the applicant states. Thus, according to Commis-
sion offi cials, ‘adopting the EU acquis, irrespective of any imperfections, 
would still represent an improvement over the status quo’.74 Indeed, the 
acquis comprises a ready-made corpus of rules that needs to be accepted 
en bloc,75 and which will be diffi cult to develop in the absence of effec-
tive domestic policy-making and legislative processes.76 Accordingly, the 
Commission sets the transposition of and the alignment with the acquis 
in all areas of EU law as the short and medium-term objectives in the 
Accession Partnerships.77 
Inevitably, this approach encourages the setting of benchmarks 
and an appraisal of progress on the basis of a quantitative evaluation 
has also been used in relation to the CEECs. See, for example, Commission, ‘Towards the 
Enlarged Union - Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the Progress 
towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries’ (Communication) COM(2002) 700 
fi nal 11.
74  Michaela Dodini and Marko Fantini, ‘The EU Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for 
Economic Growth and Stability’ (2006) 44 JCMS 507, 513-514.
75  Guy Harpaz and Lior Herman, ‘Approximation of Laws by Non-EU Countries to the EU 
Acquis’ (2007) 9 EJLR 357, 357.
76  Andreas Herdina, ‘Approximation of Laws in the Context of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy’ (2007) 9 EJLR 501. 
77  See, for instance, the 1999 Accession Partnership with Hungary, which requests, for 
example, the complete transposition and enforcement of legislation in the area of nature 
protection under the environmental chapter: Council Decision 1999/850/EC of 6 Decem-
ber 1999 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in 
the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Hungary [1999] OJ L335/1.
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of transposed legislation. Indeed, progress is measured on the basis of 
a country’s track record of ‘decisions actually taken, legislation actually 
adopted, international conventions actually ratifi ed (…) and measures 
actually implemented’.78 The Commission clearly implies here that it ex-
amines what is actually happening on the ground as opposed to merely 
trusting the promises made by the negotiating partners. However, the 
analysis in the annual progress reports and remarks made in the annu-
al reports of the fi nancing instruments79 shows that the approach has 
in actual fact been mostly quantitative with a focus on crunching data 
and numbers.80 For instance, in the 2000 Regular Report on Romania’s 
progress towards accession it is mentioned that ‘[i]n 1999, only 59 of 
the 453 draft laws, ordinances and emergency ordinances submitted to 
Parliament were adopted by the end of the year. This represents a signif-
icant decrease in comparison to previous years’.81 In a similar fashion, 
Turkey’s 2005 Regular Report states that ‘[a]fter the intensive reforms of 
the previous two years, Parliament continued its regular legislative work. 
A total of 184 draft laws have been submitted to Parliament since Oc-
tober 2004. Between October 2004 and June 2005 Parliament adopted 
166 new laws’.82 In relation to the CEECs, the same emphasis on legis-
lative output is discernible. In its 1999 Regular Report the Commission 
admonishes the Czech Republic: ‘The pace of legislative alignment … has 
not picked up signifi cantly and progress is uneven across sectors’.83 Or, 
more positively, ‘Hungary continued to make progress in aligning and 
implementing the acquis in many areas’.84
The reports also demonstrate that, in the essentially top-down EU 
driven process of legal approximation, compliance with the acquis is 
equated with success in legal reform.85 According to the Commission, 
78  See, for example, the Commission’s description and justifi cation of its methodology in 
the Regular Report on Slovenia’s Progress Towards Accession, SEC(2002) 1411, 9. 
79  The annual reports on the PHARE Regulation in particular discuss progress of the can-
didate states in terms of ‘the momentum reached in transposing legislation’ and ‘signifi -
cant progress in legislative harmonization’. See, for example, Commission, ‘The Phare Pro-
gramme - Annual Report 1998’ (Communication) COM(2000) 183 fi nal 25; Commission, 
‘2002 Report on Phare and the Pre-Accession Instruments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey’ 
SEC(2003) 910, Annex 26. 
80  Martin Mendelski, ‘Das Europäische Evaluierungsdefi zit der Rechtsstaatlichkeit’ (2016) 
11 Leviathan 366, 373.
81  Romania Regular Report, COM(2000) 710 fi nal 15 (emphasis added). 
82  Turkey Progress Report, SEC(2005) 1426 fi nal 10. 
83  Czech Republic Regular Report, COM(99) 503 fi nal 57.
84  Hungary Regular Report, SEC(2001) 1748 fi nal 95. 
85  Rilka Dragneva, ‘CIS Model Legislation and Its Contribution to Company Law Reform 
and Harmonization’ in Rilka Dragneva (ed), Investor Protection in the CIS: Legal Reform and 
Harmonization (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 1-2.
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‘putting fl esh on the legislative bones’86 is essential to progress along 
the road to eventual accession. As underlined by Bruszt and Stark, the 
defi nition of success [in enlargement] is not the reduction of the state 
but ‘getting the rules right’; the Europeanisation which the applicant 
states undertake is thus, ‘a kind of normalization − a process of meeting 
norms and standards numbering in the tens of thousands’.87 However, 
as pointed out, it is questionable whether measuring the outcome of law 
transplants in terms of implementation is an over-simplifi cation, which 
remains short of capturing the reality of legal change.88 While the en-
largement success story of the fi fth enlargement round (CEECs) com-
ports with quantitative studies examining the behaviour of new mem-
bers − fi nding that they transpose and comply with EU law at rates 
similar to older Member States,89 in contrast, qualitative studies talk of 
a ‘world of dead letters’90 − pointing to problems of legality91 as well as is-
sues of compliance.92 The EU’s ‘more is better’ mindset93 in combination 
with the compliance paradigm has led to the adoption of benchmarks 
that emphasises quantity over quality, whereby no consideration is given 
to legality’s requirements at the domestic level. As will be shown in the 
next section, there is growing evidence that the quantitative approach 
followed by the EU in fact often undermines legality, and thus the rule 
of law, by not considering the requirements for the quality of laws at the 
domestic level. 
86  Poland Regular Report, SEC(2001) 1752 fi nal 101. 
87  Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark, ‘Who Counts? Supranational Norms and Societal Needs’ 
(2003) 17 EEPS 74, 74. 
88  See also Randall Peerenboom, ‘What Have We Learned about Law and Development? De-
scribing, Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China’ (2006) 27 MJIL 823, 834-836.
89  Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Is Europeanisation Through Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-in of 
Institutional Change after EU Accession’ (2012) 35 WEurPol 20, 20; Bernard Steunenberg 
and Dimiter Toshkov, ‘Comparing Transposition in the 27 Member States of the EU: The 
Impact of Discretion and Legal Fit’ (2009) 16 JEurPP  951, 951.
90  Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib and Elisabeth Holzleithner (eds), Compliance in the Enlarged 
European Union: Living Rights or Dead Letters? (Ashgate 2008).
91  KmeziÊ (n 45); Martin Mendelski, ‘The EU’s Pathological Power: The Failure of External 
Rule of Law Promotion in South Eastern Europe’ (2015) 39 SEE 318; Martin Mendelski, 
‘Europeanization and the Rule of Law: Towards a Pathological Turn’ (2016) 40 SEE 346.
92  Jonathan B Slapin, ‘How European Union Membership Can Undermine the Rule of Law 
in Emerging Democracies’ (2015) 38 WEurPol 627, 627.
93  Martin Mendelski, ‘The EU’s Rule of Law Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Where and Why Does It Fail, and What Can Be Done About It?’  (2016) Bingham Centre for 
the Rule of Law Global Rule of Law Exchange Papers 11 <http://anticorrp.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/Mendelski-2016.-The-EUs-rule-of-law-promotion-in-Central-and-East-
ern-Europe.pdf> accessed 20 October 2019.
44 Lisa Louwerse: Mind the Gap: Issues of Legality in the EU’s Conceptualisation of the Rule...
4.2 Pre-accession, the duty of the transposition of the acquis, and 
problems of legality 
In this section it will be shown that the quantitative progress anal-
ysis of the implementation of the acquis and the concomitant changes to 
domestic legislation adopted by the Commission comes with a specifi c 
set of problems that actually undermine legality.  It is submitted that in 
combination with the speed of reforms, the demonstrable struggle of the 
applicant countries with administrative and judicial capacity, and the 
necessity of establishing a ‘solid track record’, the demand for more laws 
has potentially fostered legal infl ation, instability, lack of generality of 
law, as well as problems of enforcement.94 
The Commission has recognised, in a number of reports throughout 
the years, that there are problems of legislative quality arising from the 
tension between the need to attain the agreed targets and the impact on 
the quality of the implemented legislation at the domestic level. For ex-
ample, in FYROM’s 2007 Progress Report: 
[A] backlog of EU-related legislation built up in the second half of 2006. 
The government, in pursuit of its stated objective of having all the legis-
lation for 2006 and 2007 adopted by the end of the summer, stepped up 
its efforts on legislative drafting. It managed to catch up partially, but 
without always giving suffi cient attention to the quality and enforcea-
bility of legislation.95 
Moreover, a lack of expertise on EU issues at the domestic level may 
also hamper the harmonisation of legislation, as evidenced, for example, 
by the 2007 Progress Report on Albania in which it is stated that ‘[t]he 
level of expertise available to the parliament, including on EU integra-
tion issues, remains low. This is refl ected in the quality of legislation’.96 
Serbia’s 2009 Progress Report highlights a related issue. There has been 
increased legislative output by parliament, although there is a need ‘to 
improve ex ante compatibility checks with EU standards before legisla-
tion is adopted. There has, moreover, been insuffi cient public consulta-
tion on content and impact of draft laws’.97  
Furthermore, because of the quantitative agreements underlying 
the adoption of the acquis, the speed of reform becomes a particular 
issue in and of itself, undermining legislative quality. The ‘hasty trans-
94  For empirical evidence on these so-called ‘pathologies of Europeanization’, see Mendelski 
(n 91) 353-357.
95  The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress Report, SEC(2007) 1432 fi nal 7 
(emphasis added). 
96  Albania Progress Report, SEC(2007) 1429 fi nal 6. 
97  Serbia Progress Report, SEC(2009) 1339 fi nal 7.
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plant-syndrome’98 meant that the enormous implementation load, in com-
bination with the time pressure and the Commission’s strong emphasis on 
effectiveness rather than evidence-based policy-making, has rendered the 
accession process into a predominantly technical process of rule trans-
fer.99 However, where regulations during pre-accession are best transposed 
through a single act containing its copy/pasted text, in the case of direc-
tives, proper implementation requires substantive policy choices as to how 
the rights and obligations are to be distributed in society in order for the 
normative aim of the directive to be achieved.100 This takes time and ex-
pertise − and more attention than a mere 40 seconds in parliament per 
piece of legislation over a period of some months in 2008 in North-Mace-
donia,101 a situation assessed by the Commission as detrimental to the 
quality of law.102 Many similar examples can be found in relation to the 
CEECs. For instance, in 2002, the Commission showed concern for Roma-
nia’s parliamentary ability to effectively scrutinise legislation because of 
tight deadlines in combination with an increased volume of legislation.103 
Where it took Greece well over a decade to adapt to the EU’s single market, 
by contrast, the CEECs and Western Balkan countries are expected to 
have oriented their institutions and policies to the EU prior to member-
ship. Moreover, they are doing this from a much lower starting-point and 
with very limited scope for negotiating transitional periods.104 
Because of the top-down nature of the process, the pace of imple-
mentation has also been infl uenced by something coined ‘campaign re-
form’. This has meant, for example, that the timing of the output has 
98  Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘EU Law Export to the Eastern Neighbour-
hood’ in Paul James Cardwell, EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era 
(Springer 2012) 217, 221.
99  Marija Risteska, ‘The Role of the EU in Promoting Good Governance in Macedonia: To-
wards Effi ciency and Effectiveness or Deliberative Democracy?’ (2013) Journal of National-
ism and Ethnicity 431, 442.
100  According to Capeta, upon membership, regulations will acquire direct applicability in 
the new Member State that has, during the accession period, transposed all regulations 
of the acquis into domestic law. Consequently, this creates an obligation for the legislator 
to repeal these norms. In relation to the quality of law, considering the margin of error, it 
might not be optimal to repeal national implementing laws, particularly if the EU regula-
tions impose obligations of fi nancial liabilities or criminal offences. Tamara Capeta, ‘Har-
monisation of National Legislation with the Acquis Communautaire’, Venice Commission 
seminar on The Quality of Law, CDL-UDT(2010)017, 8-10 <www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/default.aspx?pdffi le=CDL-UDT(2010)017-e> accessed 20 October 2019. 
101  Risteska (n 99) 441. 
102  Commission, ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009’ (Communication) 
COM(2008) 674 fi nal. 
103  Romania Regular Report, SEC(2002) 1409 fi nal 21.
104  Heather Grabbe, ‘Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Acces-
sion Process’ in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of European-
ization (OUP 2003) 303, 306.
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matched the fi nancial facility constraints.105 Or that high-level EU summit 
meetings served simultaneously as deadlines for legislative action.106 Simi-
lar timeframe-related effects could be seen in the case of the Commission’s 
proposal for a ‘roadmap’ for completing the negotiations with the CEECs 
until the end of 2002.107 As a consequence, the possibility of taking local 
needs and/or conditions into account is severely limited. This has given 
rise to various fast-track procedures, risking reducing parliaments to little 
more than rubber stamps,108 and thereby undermining their legitimacy.109 
Examples of such problematic urgency procedures can be found in almost 
all applicant countries. In Slovakia, the constitution was amended in 2001 
to allow government to sidestep the parliament altogether in order to issue 
decrees in the execution of the Europe Agreement;110 in Lithuania, an av-
erage of 22.8% of legislation was enacted using urgency or special urgency 
procedures between 1992 and 2004, whereas in Latvia the rate was even 
higher at 39.1% over the period 1993-2002;111 in Romania the adoption 
of some of the acquis into national law was done by way of extraordinary 
governmental decrees, which required only retrospective approval.112 How-
ever, while the Commission in Romania’s Report stated that this practice 
is a matter of concern ‘since legislation can be adopted before adequate 
consultation has taken place and because Parliament’s powers to modify 
or reject the ordinances, without a time limit being set for the examination 
of the ordinances, can lead to legislative instability’, it continued to push 
for more ‘progress’.113
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It is acknowledged that hasty adoption and the subsequent lack of 
quality can also lead to instability problems further down the road, as 
demonstrated, for instance, by the number of amended laws during the 
pre-accession period in Poland. In the 1997-2011 and 2001-2005 terms of 
parliament, domestic amendments accounted for approximately 60% of 
all adopted statutory measures. Data show that many laws were amend-
ed more than once. Out of the 184 statutory laws adopted and amended 
in the period 2001-2004, 50% were amended once, 20% were changed 
twice, and the remaining 30% were subject to change three or more 
times. Signifi cantly, there is evidence to show that there were laws that 
were amended 23, 18 and 13 times within a period of only three years.114 
Similar to amendments, annulments also create issues of instability and 
coherence. This is visible in, for example, the Progress Reports on FY-
ROM. In 2011, the Constitutional Court increased the number of annul-
ments of new legislation by 5% to nearly 30% of all laws.115 In 2014, this 
trend showed no sign of diminishing, with visible complications for the 
coherence of the legal framework: 
The number of constitutional challenges received and handled annual-
ly remains on par with previous years, but there still have not been any 
steps taken to improve legal certainty as regards legislation which has 
been annulled due to unconstitutionality, and this often creates gaps 
in the legal framework.116 
In addition to this, the reports frequently mention that monitoring 
implementation117 and compliance118 of new legislation with the acquis 
remains a diffi cult task.
Of course, legislative growth in general potentially produces legisla-
tive instability, because new laws are often introduced through amend-
ments of the legal framework.119 Empirical evidence shows that the 
candidate countries had to deal with excessive quantities of legislation 
stemming, amongst other things, from the harmonisation requirements. 
Between 2001 and 2015, the legislative output indicator showed a 98% 
increase in the number of adopted laws per year for the Western Balkan 
114  Klaus H Goetz and Radoslaw Zubek, ‘Government, Parliament and Law-making in Po-
land’ (2007) 13 JLS 517, 536.
115  The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress Report, SEC(2011) 1203 fi nal 11. 
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See, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, SWD(2013) 415 fi nal 20; Kosovo 
Report, SWD(2016) 363 fi nal 28.
117  Montenegro Report, SWD(2016) 360 fi nal 5.
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countries.120 For a few examples, Serbia went from 47 to 265 adopted laws 
per year in the period 2003-2009, with Croatia (from 182 to 308) demon-
strating a similar trend.121 Between 1995 and 2001, the legislative output 
in Romania grew from 132 to 782 adopted laws per year.122 Lithuania went 
from a total of 1,690 adopted laws in the period of 1992-1996 to 2,631 over 
the period of 2000-2004, with the other two Baltic states of Latvia and 
Estonia showing similar increases.123 The parliamentary workload during 
the pre-accession process was such that a former deputy speaker of the 
Polish Sjem discussed it in terms of ‘a true legislative deluge’.124  
The acknowledgement that the legal approximation process under-
taken by the candidate states has led to questionable developments in re-
lation to the requirements of formal legality such as stability, and coher-
ence has recently gained traction in political science literature but has 
so far not been recognised in legal literature.125 Political science scholars 
have been building on the critical law and development literature and the 
growing realisation that ‘law is not a kitchen appliance that we can un-
plug in the United States or Germany and simply plug in again in Rus-
sia’,126 and that introducing the right laws is insuffi cient to create incen-
tives for the correct behaviour in developing and transition countries.127 
After all, laws do not catalyse change, but merely refl ect change that has 
already taken place at a cultural/societal level.128 Generally speaking, 
for law to be effective, it must be meaningful in the context in which it is 
applied so citizens have the incentive to use the law, and institutions will 
enforce and develop the law. The notion of compliance means that simply 
drafting new laws is not enough to ensure that they work.129 The quality 
of the rule of law and the effective transposition of the acquis depends 
not only on the administrative capacity in an applicant state, but also 
the degree to which the new rules and practices are internalised by state 
functionaries and citizens alike. Thus, faster and more extensive imple-
mentation processes produce serious problems of compliance, especially 
in societies demoralised by decades of authoritarian rule.130 
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Accordingly, judges, lawyers, politicians, and other legal intermediar-
ies that are responsible for developing the law ‘must be able to increase the 
quality of law in a way that is responsive to demand for legality’.131 Interest-
ingly, the origin of the law per se is not necessarily the crux of the problem, 
rather, complications stem from ‘law reform processes that generally do not 
permit users to participate in adapting the draft − whatever its origin − to lo-
cal conditions. … Lack of local input, not transplantation is the problem’.132 
Consequently, it is emphasised that ‘adaptation’ is preferred over ‘adoption’, 
ie without taking local conditions into account, attempting to use a pattern 
of law outside the environment of its origin entails the risk of rejection.133 
However, it should be pointed out that the EU’s model is one of adoption 
rather than adaptation because of the specifi c nature of the acquis. 
4.3 The impenetrable nature of the acquis and the questions this 
raises for its role as an instrument of development
The acquis is a unifying concept in that it is a shared standard in 
which, at least in principle, every Member State, and thus, also every 
future Member State, has an equal stake.134 It is the EU’s genetic identi-
ty135 and acts to preserve the sui generis code of European integration,136 
which accounts for the need to ensure its self-preservation and contin-
ued coherent development. Accordingly, it is projected by the EU as the 
‘right’ legal template, as an objective standard, albeit one over which 
the EU has exclusive control. Of course, as Magen has pointed out, as 
a non-national, shared patrimony of democratic Member States with a 
high degree of international standing who adhere to it themselves, ‘the 
acquis communautaire enjoys a respectable pedigree and a high degree of 
legitimacy’.137 This makes it also the exclusive and comprehensive legal 
template from which deviations or opt-outs are not permitted for the as-
piring Member States.138 In this sense, the term ‘negotiation’ is mislead-
131  Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘Economic Develop-
ment, Legality and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 EE Rev 165, 167.
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as an Instrument of EU External Relations’ (2007) 9 EJLR 361, 370.
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ing, as it suggests an openness that does not exist in the accession pro-
cess.139 Indeed, the one-sided nature of the pre-accession process has led 
Zielonka to characterise it as looking ‘rather like an imperial exercise of 
asserting political and economic control’.140 As demonstrated above, the 
pre-accession negotiations mainly consist of a process of rule-transfer, 
Commission screening and reporting, during which the applicant’s prog-
ress in adopting the acquis is monitored. Essentially, the acquis comes 
as a non-negotiable package, with implementation being portrayed as 
a technical/administrative task rather than a political one.141 However, 
this absence of the possibility of engagement limits from the outset its 
potential for becoming ‘living law’ in the applicant states.142 Indeed, ‘the 
effort to plough through reform blueprints … resembles a form of depen-
dent development, to the point of precluding the ‘organic’ development of 
accountable domestic policies’.143 Since the requirements in relation to 
the acquis are non-negotiable, uniformly applied, and closely enforced, 
there is little possibility of actual adaptation.144
It seems that there is an assumption in much of the language used 
in the ‘Copenhagen documents’ on enlargement that accession and tran-
sition are part of the same process. Or, in the words of Grabbe, ‘that 
preparations to join the Union are coterminous with overall development 
goals’.145 This is, for example, visible in the 2016 enlargement strategy 
in which the Commission stated that ‘…it is important to recognise that 
accession negotiations are not − and never have been − an end in them-
selves. They are part of a wider process of modernisation and reforms’.146 
However, there are various reasons to be sceptical about the acquis’ suit-
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ability as a template for reforms in the (potential) candidate states. The 
EU regulatory framework was never designed as a development agen-
da.147 The Union’s policies and regulatory models have been created to 
fi t economies at a different level of development than the CEECs at the 
time or the Western Balkan countries now,148 and they require complex 
institutional structures for implementation. Moreover, the acquis con-
tains anomalies that are the outcome of a bargaining process between 
the different interests of the Member States and the institutions,149 and 
has accumulated over a period of up to half a century, often amended 
and incrementally adjusted. According to Cameron, it is no exaggeration 
to say that:
… on accession, the new members will be re-created as states, commit-
ted to processes of policy-making and policy outcomes that in many 
instances bear little or no relation to their domestic policy-making 
processes and prior policy decisions but refl ect, instead, the politics, 
policy-making processes, and policy choices of the EU and its earlier 
Member States.150 
Interestingly, the Commission seems, at least to some extent, to be 
aware of this paradox in relation to its instrumental use of the acquis in 
enlargement. In a 2001 Communication on ‘simplifying and improving 
the regulatory environment’ it stated that
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the acquis communautaire is highly regarded for its basic raft of rights 
and integrating provisions and, at the same time, denigrated for its 
complexity of access, comprehension and application. … Any diffi cul-
ties are bound to increase with the arrival of new Member States which 
will have to digest this corpus of rules and regulation.151 
However, 15 years later, little seems to have changed. After over a 
decade of plans involving attempts at prioritising better regulation prin-
ciples, the Commission echoed its earlier assessment of the acquis: ‘The 
EU has frequently been criticised − often rightly − for producing excessive 
and badly written regulations and for meddling in the lives of citizens or 
businesses with too many detailed rules’.152 Accordingly, in the light of 
the critique and the Commission’s own acknowledgement of the negative 
effects that stem from the transposition of the acquis during the pre-ac-
cession period, in combination with the above, at the very least questions 
arise as to the extent to which the EU’s method of legal approximation in 
the enlargement policy is bound to undermine legality by its very nature.
5 Conclusion: some policy refl ections on conceptualisation, 
methodology, and parliamentary engagement
In this article, it was argued that the EU’s conceptualisation of the 
rule of law in enlargement is fl awed by virtue of the fact that the core el-
ement of the rule of law, namely, legality, is largely absent. It was demon-
strated that in the Copenhagen documentation, containing the Commis-
sion’s yearly monitoring reports, enlargement strategies, and the Council 
conclusions on enlargement, little to no room has been dedicated to the 
progress assessment of this element. Against this background, the ar-
ticle took a closer look at the pre-accession process and it was asserted 
that the very methodology used in relation to the implementation of the 
acquis has the potential of undermining legality in the acceding states. 
It was demonstrated that, despite the promises made by former Commis-
sioner Füle to the effect that the accession negotiations would not simply 
involve a ticking of boxes on the issue of legislative approximation, the 
accession framework is set up in such a way to do just that − with its em-
phasis on the quantitative progress analysis of the implementation of the 
acquis. On the basis of careful analysis of the relevant documents, it was 
argued that the use of benchmarks in this area, in combination with the 
infl exibility of the process and the added time pressure, undermine le-
gality, leading to problems of legal infl ation, instability, lack of generality 
151  Commission, ‘Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory Environment’ (Communica-
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of law and coherence, as well as problems of enforcement. Consequently, 
by choosing quantitative progress analysis over qualitative scrutiny of 
the applicant states’ headway in their process of legal approximation, the 
Commission might not be taking all rule of law elements into account in 
the way that it should. 
The article went on to argue that even though this is recognised by 
the Commission, over the years the EU has not amended its method-
ology, thereby failing to recognise that ensuring respect for the rule of 
law is not merely a process of adoption of a corpus of rules, but rather 
a complex process of adaptation to a particular value system. However, 
the article concluded by questioning whether the particular nature of 
the acquis itself might not be a limiting factor in this. It was shown that 
the acquis, as the genetic code of the European project, forms a corpus 
of rules under the exclusive control of the EU, making it an inherently 
infl exible legal template for the applicant states to take on. Moreover, it 
was demonstrated that, by the Commission’s own admission, the quality 
and complexity of the acquis leaves considerable room for improvement, 
raising questions as to its suitability as an instrument for development 
in the (potential) candidate countries. 
Where does this leave the EU in relation to its conceptualisation of 
the rule of law in the pre-accession procedure? Two policy refl ections are 
presented here. The fi rst refl ection relates to the necessity to incorporate 
legality in its rule of law conceptualisation. The institutions have consis-
tently underlined ‘the importance of placing the rule of law even more at 
the heart of enlargement policy’.153 This has resulted in an enlargement 
strategy which has placed a high value on addressing the rule of law at 
the early stages of the process in order to afford candidates the opportu-
nity to ‘demonstrate their ability to strengthen the practical realisation of 
the values on which the Union is based at all stages of the accession pro-
cess’.154 However, while this has led, amongst other things, to additional 
moments for measuring progress,155 the underlying conceptualisation of 
the rule of law has, by and large, not substantively changed. This means 
that even though the Commission, as shown above, has acknowledged 
the recurring problems in relation to legislative approximation, the large-
153  Commission, ‘Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-
2013’ (Communication) COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 4. See also, for example, 
Council, ‘Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process’ (Conclusions) General 
Affairs Council, Doc. No.17604/12, 11 December 2012, point 37, as well as Council, ‘En-
largement and Stabilisation and Association Process’(Conclusions) General Affairs Council, 
Doc. 10555/18, 26 June 2018, point 5 
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ly institutional focus and the lack of attention to legality has remained. 
Considering the problems outlined in section 4 of this article, it is appar-
ent that the EU, at the very minimum, should try and look past its insti-
tutional lens in relation to the rule of law to incorporate legality and its 
constituent aspects in its understanding of the value. In order to do this 
and also to make the applicant countries more aware of the problemat-
ic issues underlying legality, the already existing rule of law dialogues 
that were set up with three of the Western Balkan countries under the 
Stabilisation and Association Process156 could be used. They would need 
to include, next to the current focus on the institutional rule of law ele-
ments related to an independent judiciary, issues of legality fl eshed out 
by the Commission in more concrete terms. 
The second refl ection concerns the related issue of the engagement 
of national parliaments with the approximation process. As was shown 
above, the issues undermining legality mainly focus on the deluge of 
EU legislation that needs to be transposed and the speed of reforms 
required by the EU, in combination with a lack of capacity and/or suf-
fi cient EU-related expertise. A study related to the CEECs and enlarge-
ment concluded that there was little debate on EU conditionality within 
the CEEC parliaments.157 Since the implementation was/is often viewed 
as an administrative rather than a legislative process,158 the substance 
of parliamentary debates often remains rather general.159 In any case, 
candidate countries are not expected to debate the acquis since it is 
non-negotiable and EU law takes priority over national law, a duty in 
which the applicant states are expected to shadow the Member States. 
This mechanical approach entails very limited involvement for national 
parliaments in the accession process beyond the formal structure. It has 
also led at times to a failure to adopt mechanisms to soften the transition 
which would have allowed national problems and particularities to be 
better taken into account − particularly further down the road.160 
Furthermore, the quantitative approach has facilitated this lack of 
engagement with EU rules. However, while such an approach is, to a 
large extent, part and parcel of a policy that relies on benchmarking 
and conditionality, the pre-accession strategy seems to have elevated it 
to an end in and of itself. Only targets are evaluated, not the (quality 
of) transposition. Of course, the scope of the rule transfer extends to 
156  These are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. 
157  Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, Eastward Enlargement of the European Union (Roy-
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the acquis and does not transcend this in order to incorporate how the 
national legislative processes address it.161 Approximation of the acquis, 
legally speaking, amounts to voluntary adaptation, since it differs from 
the harmonisation obligations incumbent on the Member States. Apart 
from national control mechanisms, no enforcement procedures exist. 
However, since a demonstrable track-record of implementation is valued 
more than parliamentary involvement, for legality to be higher on the ra-
dar, this is an issue that would need to be addressed. In order to do this, 
similar programmes to the existing ones on best practices relating to the 
rule of law in connection with judicial training spring to mind.162 The 
idea behind these is to facilitate exchanges between the staff of the var-
ious (levels of) judiciaries in the Member States and their counterparts 
in the applicant countries in order to provide the latter with insights into 
the different practices in the EU. In order to tackle the issue of the lack 
of knowledge related to EU affairs, this approach could be useful. Partic-
ularly, if the Member States of Central and Eastern Europe were willing 
to share their experiences, having gone to similar exercises themselves. 
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